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Abstract: The creation of a new administrative institution known as the
"Stability Preservation Office" at the central level, which is overseen by
the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Central Committee and has
branches at every local level, from streets and townships to enterprises,
and has extraordinary powers to override other regular institutions and
branches of government, is a clear indication that the Chinese govern-
ment's efforts to preserve stabüit)' are not limited to the conventional
business of crime control or public security. This paper traces the origin
of the discourse and practice of preserving stability and the rights de-
fence movement in China, investigating the interplay or interaction be-
tween the two. It examines the end and the means of stability preserva-
tion, explores whether the measures taken by the government to pre-
serve stability or the rights protection actions taken by citizens are the
root cause of social unrest, and whether the suppression of discontent or
the improvement of human rights and social justice is the better way to
achieve social stability in contemporary China. It contributes to our un-
derstanding of emerging state-society relations and the latest social and
political trends in China.
• Manusctipt received 9 January 2012; accepted 6 July 2012
Keywords: China, stability, human rights
Dr. Feng Chongyi is an Associate Professor in China Studies, University
of Technology, Sydney and adjunct Professor of History, Nankai Universi-
ty, Tianjin. His current research focuses on intellectual and political devel-
opment in modern and contemporary China, as well as political economy
of China's provinces. His research explores the intellectual and political
changes, the growth of rights consciousness and democratic forces in
particular, leading to constitutional democracy in China. He is author of
nine books and editor of eight edited books, he published 90 articles in
academic journals and edited volumes, and numerous articles in news-
papers and on the Internet. He has been named one of the top hundred




Post-1989 politics in China have been dominated by the concepts of
weiiven (ÉÈ^, preserving stability) on the part of the government and
iveiquan (áftííl, rights protection) on the part of the people. Since the
1990s, preser\'ing stabilit}' has been the overriding concern of the Chine-
se government, forming an interesting contrast to the emergence of the
Weiquan or "rights defence" movement (^f t i£zí ] , iveiquanyundon^ in
Chinese society. Possible instabilit}' was already a worry among some
China scholars at the end of the last centur)' (Shambaugh 2000). It has
been argued that stability discourse has played a key role in legitimating
the rule of the Chinese Communist Part}' after the Tiananmen crack-
down in 1989 (Sandby-Thomas 2011; Shue 2004: 24-49). The creation of
a new administrative institution known as the "Stabilit}' Presentation
Office" at the central level, which is overseen by the CCP Central Com-
mittee and has branches at ever)' local level right down to streets, town-
ships and enterprises with extraordinär}' powers to override other regular
institutions and branches of government, is a clear indication that the
Chinese government's efforts to presen'e stabilit}' are not limited to the
conventional business of crime control or public securit}'. This paper
traces the origin of the discourse and practice of preser\'-ing stability and
the rights defence movement in China, investigating the interplay or
interaction between the two. It examines the end and the means of sta-
bility preser\'ation, explores whether the stability preservation measures
taken by the government or the rights protection actions taken by citi-
zens are the root cause of social unrest, and whether the suppression of
discontent or the improvement of human rights and social justice is the
better way to achieve social stabilit}^ in contemporar}' China. It is hoped
that this paper will shed light on emerging state-societ}' relations and the
latest social and political trends in China.
H/e/Vi/en as the Post-1989 Political Order in China
The system of stabilit}' preservation (i^Ü'í^^'J, weiwen tii^hi) in China took
shape in the post-communist world after 1989, in response to a new
international order in which the remaining communist part}'-states had
lost their ideolog}'-based legitimacy. There was a decisive shift in the
focus of stabilit}' preservation in China before and after 1989, although
stability had been a major political objective in this vast countr}' since the
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end of Mao's Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, commonly known
as the Cultural Revolution, in 1976. Needless to say, social and political
stability is particularly desirable in China, a country that has suffered
successive wars, foreign invasions, domestic rebellions, revolutions and
other political campaigns, and social upheavals during the last two centu-
ries. Regime stability in contemporary China, however, is quite another
matter, as it can be argued that the preservation of the communist auto-
cracy at all costs has in fact become the root cause of Chinese social and
political instability. In the period following the death of Chairman Mao
in 1976 up until the Tiananmen Incident in 1989, regime stability
through communist rule was the means to achieve social and political
stability, and was pursued eagerly by both society and the party-state.
During this period, the Chinese communist regime left behind self-in-
duced instability characterised by endless class struggle and political
campaigns, laid emphasis on social and political stability as a necessary
condition for economic modernisation and. attempted to carry out politi-
cal reform in the direction of creating a liberal and democratic order.
Participation in globalisation and rapid integration into the world system
also facilitated "China's overall interest in economic growth and social
stability at home and security abroad" (Lagervist 2010: 222). Neverthe-
less, after 1989, due mainly to the legitimacy crisis caused by both the
suppression of the pro-democracy movement at home and the world-
wide coUapse of communist regimes abroad, the regime stability of the
communist rule became an end in itself. When the Chinese communist
party-state was in danger of being rendered obsolete by the changing
historical tide and had lost its mandate to a monopoly of political power,
the CCP leadership was driven by the political imperative to pursue re-
gime survival at the expense of other concerns, such as democratic re-
forms and social progress.
"Stability" had already become a part of the Party une before the
Cultural Revolution had come to a turbulent close. Even the restiess
revolutionär)' leader Chairman Mao himself, perhaps tired of the succes-
sive political upheavals and power struggles towards the end of his life,
set the political line as early as in November 1974 for the Part)' to
achieve the tasks of "stability and unity" ( $ S H É p , anding tuanjie) and the
"development of the national economy" (ÍGfflKea;íííSi_hi, ba guomin
jingigao shangqu) (Mao 1998: 402, 410). His major rationale, as he men-
tioned on another occasion in August 1975, was that "the Great Prole-
tarian Cultural Revolution has lasted for eight years. There should be
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Stabilit)' now" (Mao 1998: 402). The Great Leader's highest directives for
"stabilit)' and unity" notwithstanding, it took two more years after Mao's
death for the new CCP leadership to actually work out the new political
line in which the slogans of revolution were supplanted by the quest for
the "Four Modernisations" and political turmoil and class struggle gave
way to economic reform and development.
Regarding the Cultural Revolution as "ten years of chaos", Mao's
successors shifted their focus to creating social and political stabilit)' for
economic reconstruction in the last few years of the 1970s and the early
1980s, when anding tuanjie, a normal social and political order free of
destructive political campaigns, was the common aspiration for both the
government and the population. During this period, the Chinese com-
munist regime went through a transformation from a totalitarian auto-
cracy that maintained one-part)' rule through the personalit)' cult of the
leader and lawless mass campaigns to eliminate "class enemies" to a
post-totalitarian autocracy that maintained one-party rule through the
rule by law and by giving up its complete monopoly on the economy and
society. Chinese societ)' also went through a transformation from totali-
tarian socialism without pluralism in any area to post-totalitarian social-
ism with the emergence of a plural space for the limited development of
individual autonomy, market economy, civil societ)', intellectual freedom
and international intercourse (Feng 2008).
During most of the 1980s, stabilit)' was pursued hand-in-hand with
reform and opening up, which became the main focus of the CCP. Re-
formist officials such as Hu Yaobang, Zhao Ziyang, Wan Li, Xi
Zhongxun, Li Rui, Zhu Houze, Du Runsheng, Ren Zhong)â, and Xiang
Nan were promoted to key positions to carr)' out both economic and
political reforms. Justice was regarded as a precondition of stabilit)' when
Hu Yaobang and his colleagues took the lead in redressing millions of
miscarriages of justice and rehabilitating the millions of victims of the
many political campaigns from the 1950s to the 1970s. Reform and lib-
eralisation were regarded as major contributions to stabilit)' when Zhao
Ziyang and his colleagues took the lead in dismantling the people's
commune system to liberate the peasantr)'; promoting private enterprises
and separating state-owned enterprises from the government to give fuU
play to entrepreneurship within the population; establishing special econ-
omic zones to attract foreign capital and technologies; and limiting the
power of the Part)' to increase freedom for civil ser\'ants, professionals,
academics and artists. In the spirit of reform and opening, Hu Yaobang
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and Zhao Ziyang joined hands to block the Anti-Cultural Pollution
Campaign in 1983; Zhao Ziyang worked hard to limit the impact of An-
ti-Bourgeois Liberalism in 1987; and Zhao Ziyang risked his career when
he insisted on dealing with the peaceful pro-democracy demonstrations
of students and other citizens in 1989 in accordance with the law and the
principles of democracy.
It was the paramount leader Deng Xiaoping who first put forward
the thesis "stability overrides everything", even before the bloody sup-
pression of the Tiananmen movement on 4 June. On 26 February 1989,
Deng Xiaoping told visiting U.S. President George H. W. Bush that, "In
China the overriding need is for stability. Without a stable environment,
we can accomplish nothing and may even lose what we have gained"
(Deng 1993). Deng's comment revealed a hard-line response to the so-
cial tension that was resulting from serious inflation and widespread
government corruption in early 1989, the growing demands for demo-
cratic reform from the population as manifested by student activism and
intellectuals' urgent calls for the release of political prisoners, and the
increasing momentum within the CCP leadership to push for further
political reforms like those being promoted in the communist world of
the former USSR and Eastern Europe. Deng was partiy right to argue
that stability was the necessary condition for development, including
political reform, in China but meaningful political reform was also a
necessary condition for social stabilit}', as it was precisely the lack of
democratic reforms that led to the popular protests by students and other
citizens in Beijing and other major cities throughout China.
Stability became the most powerful excuse for the hard-liners to jus-
tify the use of brutal force in the suppression of the popular protests
during and after the crackdown on the Chinese pro-democracy move-
ment in the spring of 1989, the event which ironically heralded the col-
lapse of communist regimes in other parts of the world. Up until this
point, communism throughout the world had been relatively stable.
Since the first communist party-state was established in Russia by the
Bolsheviks in 1917, the communist front had expanded until the late
1960s. However, during the period 1989-1991, most communist regimes
in the world were swept away by the waves of a democracy movement
that was supported by democrats within the communist parties of those
nations. With the Revolutions of Eastern Europe, communist autocracy
as an alternative to liberal democracy had been abandoned by human-
kind following seven decades of brutal experiments that had cost mil-
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lions of lives. By contrast, however, the "lesson" learned by the CCP
leaders during this historical transformation of the world was that the
Chinese communist regime had sur\àved because it used its army to put
down popular protests rather than yielding to popular demands for free-
dom and democracy.
FoDowing its own logic, the CCP leadership justifled the loss of life
and bloodshed in suppressing peaceful demonstrators and preser\âng
communist autocracy as a necessarj' price for safeguarding stabilit}' as the
common good. In the People's Daily editorial (People's Daily 1990) pub-
lished on the first anniversar)' of the militar}^ suppression, the CCP lead-
ership, with Jiang Zemin at the "core", asserted that "the Part}' and the
government had no choice but to resolutely quell the rebellion" in 1989,
denying the possibility' of a peaceful ending to the non-violent demon-
strations and a negotiated outcome as promoted by the moderates from
both camps; the Part)' and demonstrators. The editorial exploited the
people's profound fear of chaos, in particular, the fear of the tumultuous
years of the recent Cultural Revolution, and tainted public opinion by
imposing on Chinese societ)' the part)'-s täte's definition of stability as no
challenge to the Part)''s monopoly of political power; and, as always, the
CCP leadership also conflated the selfish interests of the party-state with
the "fundamental interests of the people" by claiming that:
The people demand stabüit)'. Stabilit)' overrides ever)thing. This is the
consensus after experiencing last year's polidcal disturbance. We must
preserve the countr)''s stabilit)' as we would safeguard our own life.
We simply cannot do anything detrimental to stabilit)' (People's Daily
1990).
In April 1991, the CCP Central Committee issued a "Circular on
Strengthening Law Enforcement Work for Preserving Social Stabilit)'",
making it clear that preserving stabilit)' had become a political task of
utmost importance to the entire Part)' and to all the people of the nation.
After the death of Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin upgraded stability
preser\'ation to an even higher level by laying down the strateg)' of "nip-
ping ever)' element of instabilit)' in the bud" ( f f i — " K ^ í l ^ l i l ^ í ' ^ ^ ^
H^íi t í í^ , bayiqie bu wendingyinsu xiaomie ^i mengua ^huangtai). The brutal
militar)' suppression of popular demonstrations in 1989 and the ensuing
ruthless purges of democratic elements in societ)' and within the part)'-
state effectively crushed the Chinese democracy movement, which re-
gained momentum only after the death of Deng Xiaoping in 1997. An-
other major stimulus to the re-emergence of the democracy movement
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came in 1997 when the Chinese government, in its efforts to join the
World Trade Organization (WTO) and benefit from economic globaliza-
tion, signed two UN human rights treaties: The International Covenant
on Civu and Political Rights and The International Covenant on Eco-
nomic and Social Rights (which was ratified by the National People's
Congress of China the following year). In mid-1998, former student
leaders of the 1989 demonstrations were joined by veteran dissidents of
the Democracy Wall Movement of the late 1970s to organise the China
Democracy Party (CDP, '^ H '^^^, Zhongguo Min^hudan^. At the end
of 1998, when Democracy Wall veteran Xu Wenli changed the course
from "preparation" to formal establishment of the CDP by calling for a
national congress, the party was brutally crushed by the Jiang Zemin
leadership and all of its leaders jailed for up to 14 years (Wright 2004:
158-180). In his comments on the report by the Ministry of Public Secur-
ity about the re-emergence of the underground Autonomous Union of
University Students ( i ^ K ^ : t ê v ê © ^ ' a ' ^ , Gao xiaoxuesheng :^^hi lian-
. hehui) at Beijing University and Qinghua Universitj' in April 1999, Jiang
Zemin issued the call to "nip every element of instability in the bud"
{Xiaocankao 1999). Beginning in June 1999, this new strategy was put into
practice on a spectacular scale in the campaign to crackdown on follow-
ers of the spiritual discipline Falungong (Chan 2004).
As shown in the table below, the special administrative structure for
dealing with stabüit}' preservation was established while Jiang held the
core position of General Secretary of the Communist Party of China.
There are two key features of these stability preservation "committees"
or "offices". First, they are placed above other regular party and gov-
ernment institutions, expanding their power far beyond the security ap-
paratus and enabling them to give orders to other institutions. Second,
they are the special task forces of the political police tasked with sup-
pressing political dissent, rather than dealing with criminal offences.
These special forces include the Domestic Security Department (fflF*3$
'^^J2.'$3K/^'^K, guonei anquan baowei i^hidui/dadui), usually shortened to
IS'fë {guobao) branch of the police force within the Ministry of Public
Security, the police of the State Security Ministry (ffl$, guo'ati), the In-
ternet police (P«l¥, wangin¿), and the censors of the propaganda appa-
ratus. In a signed People's Daily commentary, the Jiang Zemin leadership
declared that.
All levels of Party organisation and government must give promi-
nence to preserving social stability. [...] ever)' element that causes
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turmoil and destroys the verj' good situation of stability' and unit)'
must be nipped in the bud {People's Daily 1999).
According to the insightful obsen^ation and summar)^ by die deposed
Party leader Zhao Ziyang in 2000, there were five key measures taken by
the Jiang Zemin leadership to preser\^e stability:
• the suppression of the people by the militar)' and police forces;
• the control and manipulation of media; •
• the elimination of social unrest in the embr}'onic state;
• the strict ban on oppositionaJ organisations; and
• die deliver)' of economic benefits for dispute setdement in some
cases P u 2010: 230).
The "system of stability prèser\'^adon" created in the. 1990s has been
further consolidated under the Hu Jintao leadership. The strateg)' of
"nipping ever)' element of instability in die bud" has been carried oh and
the repression of social activism has been intensified by the Hu Jintao
leadership in spite of its high-profile slogans like "harmonious societ)^',
"people first" and the "scientific concept of development". This might
be explained by the fact that two of Jiang Zemin's protégés, Zhou
Yongkang and Li Shangchun, were appointed as Politburo Standing
Committee members charged with law enforcement and propaganda,
respectively, under the Hu Jintao leadership to ensure the continuity of
stability preser\'ation practice. Furtiiermore, this was the first time that
the two portfolios of law enforcement and propaganda were added to
the Politburo Standing Committee, thus increasing their importance in
the power hierarchy. The perception of the Hu Jintao leadership with
regard to the connection between stability and the ideal of the "harmon-
ious societ)'" that the Hu government promoted was best summarised in
a People's Daily commentaty which stated that:
Stabilit)' is the prerequisite and foundation of harmony. To advance
the construction of a harmonious society, we must maintain social
peace, stability and order. Without stability, there is no way to build a
socialist harmonious society. Only if we have stabilit)' are we then able
to develop the economy and achieve social harmony. Safeguarding
social order and stabüit)' is the most important task in building the
harmonious society (He 2005).
In dealing with the tension between "development" and "stability", Hu
Jintao's strateg)', as in dealing with many other tensions, was to juxtapose
both of them as equal targets of supremacy in amusing slogans like "de-
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velopment is the unyielding principle, stability is the non-negotiable task"
{'M.M.M.WiM.^i ^^•^W.ii^, fa^han shiying daoli, wending shiyingrenwu)
(Hu2011).
The Hu Jintao leadership has expanded the number of personnel
and the budget for stability preservation and has roUed back the rule of
law. Due to the strict control of the size of government personnel, usual-
ly the Office of the Public Security Comprehensive Management Com-
mittee and the Office for Stability Preservation Work at the local levels
do not have their own separate staff and, therefore, are filled with non-
staff personnel borrowed from the relevant organs and departments of
the Party and government (Liao 2009). The staffing level depends on the
available funding, as well as the amount of work to be done. However, in
recent years the Hu Jintao leadership has resumed the Mao-st}'le "mass
line" in carrying out stability preservation work. Since 2009, there has
been a nationwide drive to establish "Grassroots Centres for Petition,
Comprehensive Control and Stability Preservation" (AMIai^uVn^ftll
•t" 'ù,jiceng xinfang ^png^hi weiwen ï^hongxin) right down to the level of street
and township or even village. Each centre has five to 10 staff members,
plus dozens of informants (^^^\MM<^, weiwen xinxiyuati) and volunteers
(Vo^.'ÈiS.^, ^hi'an^iyuanv^è) recruited from the ranks of retirees and
various people on a low-income to patrol urban resident compounds,
villages, work places and local streets and roads (Hu 2010). These centres
at the grassroots level have the responsibility of keeping a close eye on
several categories of "instability suspects" ( # í i A w , shewen renyuaii) such
as Falungong adherents, members of the fioating population and peti-
tioners, and are tasked with finding out any hints of unrest and nipping
them in the bud {JkMzk^l^lî^, congyuantou shangdujue). In 2009, the for-
mal budget for internal public security actually surpassed China's huge
defence budget when it reached the level of 487 billion CNY, compared
to the 480 billion CNY defence budget (Ministry of Finance 2010; Xu et
al. 2011). The formal public security budget covers the running costs of
the three major units responsible for law and order, namely the Ministr}'
of Public Security, the Ministr}' of State Security and the People's Armed
Police, and also the expenditure of other government institutions such as
the judicial administration, the courts, and the re-education-through-
labour system. The actual expenditure is larger, as financial contributions
to security affairs and stability preservation from other government insti-
tutions and "special accounts" ( ^ ^ ¿ 5 ^ , ^uanxiangjin^ei) may not be
included in this budget.
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Table 1 : Special Institutions for Preserving Stability
The Central Politics
and Law Commis-
sion of the CCP 0$.
Oversight of the







Re-established in March 1990, with
branches at the provincial, the county
and district levels. The CCPLA had
been abolished in 1988 as part of
political reform to "separate the Partj'












Established in Februar}' 1991, with
branches at the count)' level and
personnel drawn mainly from the
security' and propaganda apparatuses.
It was renamed The Central Com-
prehensive Social Management
Commission of the Communist Party
of China (4^AI±êtS^-ê-ÎèSlgiO
^ ) ori 16 September 2011.
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Established in 1998, with top leaders
largely overlapping with those of the
Central Public Security Comprehen-
sive Management Commission.










Established in 1998, eventually with
branches at the grass-root level of








Established in June 1999, but
changed later to "The Leading Group
for Preventing and Handling Evil
Cult Organisations".
Office of the Lead-






Also known as the 610 Office as it
was first established on 10 June 1999.
Source: Author's own compilation.
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The retrogression of'Chinese official legal reform and China's march
away from the rule of law began in 2007 when Hu Jintao promoted the
"three supremacies", which put "the cause of the Party" and the "people's
interests" above the constitution and the law. Simultaneously, the state
security apparatus started to systematically target human rights lawyers
for comprehensive attack (Cohen 2009; Jiang 2009). By the early 2000s, a
consensus had been reached in China that there was a clear distinction
between the rule by law (•fk%\\,fa^hi: law as a tool for state rulers) and the
rule of law {ü'ia,fa^hi: state rulers, like everyone else, are subject to the
law). According to this consensus, the rule of law is a legal-political sys-
tem where there are meaningful legal restraints on state power and the
effective legal protection of civü liberties and human rights. Chinese
human rights law}'ers, as well as judicial independence, are an essential
part of the project to achieve the rule of law in China. It is unfortunate
that the "cause of the party" under the Hu Jintao leadership to "nip eve-
ry element of instabilit}' in the bud" offered littie place for the legal pro-
tection of civü liberties and human rights. Since 2007, almost aU promi-
nent human rights lawyers, who engage in "sensitive cases" and provide
legal assistance to a variety of victims of abuse by the state, have been
targeted by the security apparatus and other authorities with a range of
legal or ex-legal punishments, including the suspension of their licence to
practice, year-round surveulance, frequent detention, physical attacks and
imprisonment (Human Rights Watch 2008). In the meantime, in the
name of serving the "people's interests", the pre-reform practice of sub-
stituting "grand mediation" (izi^M^^^i, da tiaojieji:(hi) for legal process
has been reinstated as a means for settling disputes. The mediation is
organised and managed by the administration of the Party and govern-
ment, leaving little room for the courts to play a role in stability preserva-
tion. More alarming still was that, during the spring of 2011, many hu-
man rights lawyers and other rights activists simply "disappeared" at the
hands of the security apparatus, an apparent indication that the com-
munist government is deliberately ignoring the modest requirements of
its own laws. At a press conference on 13 March 2011, in response to a
question about which law had been violated by the foreign journalists
who were roughed up by the police on 27 February 2011, Ministry of
Foreign Affairs spokesperson Jiang Yu said:
Don't use tiie law as a shield. The real problem is that there are people
who want to see the world in chaos, and they want to make trouble in
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China. For people with these kinds of motives, I think no law can
protect them (Jiang 2011).
Paradoxically, these increased efforts at stability presen'-ation have not
resulted in a more stable society but have sown more seeds for social
instability, known in China as the vicious cycle of "stability preser\^ation
leading to more instability" ( ^ ê i ^ ^ ^ l i , yue weiwen yue bu iveti) (Social
Development Research Group 2010). "Mass incidents", the term coined
by the Chinese communist party-state to describe unapproved collective
actions like strikes, assemblies, demonstrations, petitions, blockages, col-
lective sit-ins or physical conflicts, numbered 60,000 in 2003, 74,000 in
2004, and 87,000 in 2005, or an average of more than 200 protests a day,
according to the official figures (Yu 2007). The number of "mass inci-
dents" in recent years has been estimated at beyond 100,000 a year, but
official figures have not been available since 2006, as those figures would
show the policy failure of "stability preservation". Some of these "mass
incidents" involved thousands of people and resulted in police and para-
miiitar5' intervention leading to loss of lives.
The use of violence in mass demonstrations has intensified since
2008, alongside the intensification of stability preservation. For instance,
the militant protests of Tibetans in Lhasa on 14 and 15 March 2008 led
to the destruction of many vehicles and buildings, the death of 18 civil-
ians and one police officer, as well as the injur}' of 141 civilians and 241
police officers, according to a Chinese official source. These militant
protests later spread to Qinghai, Gansu and Sichuan provinces. Accord-
ing to the Tibetan Government in ExUe, more than 140 people were
killed in the crackdown by Chinese government. Then, in June 2008,
based on the rumour that a schoolgirl had been raped and killed by the
son of a local official, thousands of people in Weng'an County, Guizhou
province joined together to burn down 160 offices and 42 vehicles be-
longing to the local government and police. This was followed by a seri-
ous incident, in July 2008, due to a dispute about the ownership of rub-
ber trees, when hundreds of peasants at Menglian Village, Yunnan prov-
ince clashed with police, resulting in the death of two villagers and the
injur)' of 19 villagers and 41 policemen. Again in November 2008, due to
resentment against forced eviction, about 30 evicted households and
thousands of other people surrounded the city government of Longnan,
Gansu province, burning 110 offices and 22 vehicles.
The wave of violent militant protests continued to hit China during
May and June 2011. During the last week of May 2011, a Mongol
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herdsman was crushed to death by a Chinese coal mine truck, igniting an
eruption of ethnic Mongol protest against the state and Han Chinese in
Inner Mongolia; then, on 26 May 2011, after nearly a decade of petition-
ing the government in vain over the forced demolition of his home,
Qian Mingqi set off a number of bombs to blow up several government
buildings, killing several people in Fuzhou, Jiangxi province. The vio-
lence continued, on 9 June 2011, when about 2,000 demonstrators at-
tacked Lichuan city government buüding in Hubei province, where a
local official investigating a questionable real-estate transaction had died
while in police detention and, on 10-12 June 2011, a scuffle between
migrant street vendors and securit}' personnel at Xintang, an industrial
town near China's southern metropolis of Guangzhou, sparked a series
of militant protests involving more than 10,000 migrant workers, who
set fire to police vehicles and offices (Beech 2011).
Since then, the new leadership headed by General Party Secretary,
State President and Commander-in-Chief Xi Jinping and Premier Li Ke-
qiang has sought to bring political reform, as well as economic reform,
back on the agenda. In December 2012, Xi Jinping chose Guangdong
Province as the destination of his first inspection tour as general secre-
tary of the Communist Party of China Central Committee, a highly sym-
bolic imitation of Deng Xiaoping's 1992 Southern Tour to demonstrate
his determination to forge ahead with reform. Addressing the 30th anni-
versary of China's revised Constitution on 4 December 2012, Xi pledged
to pursue the rule of law and stressed that "the Constitution is a legal
weapon that guarantees rights" and "any violations of the constitution
and law will be held responsible" (Xi 2012). Following his speech, an
announcement was made to phase out the unconstitutional re-education-
through-labour system. At his inaugural press conference on 17 March
2013. Premier Li also vowed to make a painful "self-imposed revolution"
in reducing government power for the further development of the mar-
ket economy and the fairer distribution of wealth and benefits (Li 2013).
However, there has been no sign yet that the new leadership is dismant-
ling the "system of stability preservation".
Obviously, the Chinese communist regime is seeking a special kind
of stability in which the priority is the regime stability of the one-part}'
autocracy, rather than the normal social stability that is preserved on the
foundation of justice, the rule of law, the protection of civü liberties and
human rights, and prevaüs in the contemporary world. In contrast, tJie
Chinese population has a different definition of stabilit}', which also
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demands a different approach to achieving genuine social stabilit)', as
demonstrated by the increasingly powerful rights defence movement in
China.
Weiquan as a Social and Political Movement
The current rights defence movement is a comprehensive movement
involving all social strata throughout the countr)' and covering ever)'
aspect of human rights. Due to a strict ban on organised opposition,
rather than taking the form of a coordinated nationwide movement, the
rights defence movement has instead developed as a diverse and increas-
ingly forceful wave of isolated cases of rights protection reported daily in
the media, for instance public interests litigation cases at courts in partic-
ular. The movement is not merely the "rightful resistance" of the rural
poor (O'Brien and Li 2006), but has also become an urban phenomenon
facilitated by the growing strength of the middle class and the latest
technologies such as the Internet and the mobile phone.
It is generally agreed among Chinese political activists and scholars
that the rights defence movement proper in China was kick-started in
2003 by two major events: the Sun Zhigang case, which resulted in the
abolition of state regulations on the detention of migrants and the entire
custody and repatriation system targeting migrant workers, and the case
of the SARS epidemic, which led to a new wave of openness in the me-
dia (Wang 2003; Fan 2005; Teng 2006). The year 2003 has been named
"the first year of rights" {^MjC^, quanliyuannian) in China (Qiu 2003:
52-53; Xian 2003; Hu 2004). Most of the cases in this rights defence
movement aim to defend economic and social rights, and include pro-
tests by peasants against excessive taxes, levies and forced seizures of
farmland; workers' strikes against low pay, arrears of pay and poor work-
ing conditions; protests by laid-off urban workers against unfair dismissal
by their employers; protests by home owners against forced e\ñction by
the government and developers; residents' protests against forced reloca-
tions; campaigns by citizens against unpaid social entidements; cam-
paigns for the rights of women and children; and protests by affected
residents against environmental pollution. However, the number of cases
to defend civil and political rights is also on the rise, and includes cam-
paigns by law)'ers, journalists and writers for the freedom of speech and
the press; campaigns by Christian house church attendees and Falungong
practitioners for the freedom of religions, beliefs, assembly and associa-
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tion; campaigns against arbitrary detention, "re-education through la-
bour", torture and excessive use of the death penalt}'; campaigns by the
victims of party-state agents against injustice and abuses of public power,
particularly by the thousands of petitioners who have fiown to the na-
tional or provincial capitals from all over the country to seek redress
from perceived injustice; protests by migrant workers against the house-
hold registration system and other discrimination; and protests by peas-
ants against irregularities and manipulation in village elections.
The claim to name 2003 as the first year of the rights defence
movement sounds odd, however, as the assertion of a variety of rights
has been a theme of the democracy movement and other civü move-
ments in China since the late 1970s. For example, the Educated Youth
Returning to Cities Movement during 1976-1979 was a large-scale
movement for the rights of residence and employment by millions of
former urban students who were "sent down to the countryside" by the
party-state during the Cultural Revolution. The Democracy Wall Move-
ment from 1978 to 1979 coincided with the Unofficial Magazines Move-
ment, which lasted until 1981, and was a pro-democracy and human
rights movement spearheaded by Chinese democracy activists who de-
manded and practised the political rights of free speech, free press and
free association. The 1989 Pro-democracy Movement led by students
and joined by millions of other citizens aimed not only to clean the gov-
ernment from corruption, but also to establish a variety of political
rights, especiaüy the right of association.
The relationship between the current rights defence movement and
the Chinese democracy movement deserves further investigation. After
the Tiananmen Massacre in 1989, the Chinese democracy movement
sank to low ebb. "Farewell to revolution" became the mainstream think-
ing among students and intellectuals, who shifted their focus from poli-
tics to elsewhere due to fear or despair. At the outset, the rights defence
movement sought compromise with the government, either in the form
of individual litigations or in the form of collective demonstrations, con-
fining its main scope to social and economic demands. The rights de-
fence movement seeks the protection of legal rights within the existing
legal-political framework, in contrast to the immediate political change
attempted by the democracy movement. This does not mean that the
human rights lawyers, liberal intellectuals and other rights activists taking
part in the movement do not cherish political aspirations for democracy,
however. Instead, their approach was more pragmatic. Even those who
36 Feng Chongj'i
clearly aimed at constitutional democracy chose to obscure their ultimate
goal by trying to make a breakthrough point by point, step by step be-
cause, at the early stage of the rights defence movement, it was clear that
fundamental political change was far from the horizon and it would have
been well nigh impossible to accomplish the whole task in their quest for
democracy at one stroke.
Furthermore, where the battle of the democracy movement was a
political process, the battle of the rights defence movement is a legal
process. Whereas legal demands were framed as political issues in the
democracy movement, political demands are framed as legal issues in the
rights defence movement. In a normal democratic societ)', legal litigation
does not constitute a social or political movement. The rights defence
movement only becomes a democracy movement when it moves into
the political domain. Under the current communist rule in China, laws
are closely linked to political institutions and political arrangements. The
party-state has never clearly differentiated politics from law, hence the
Party committee in charge of law enforcement is named the "Central
Politics and Law Commission of the CCP" ( K i è S , i^hengawei). The legal
processes involving human rights and rights law)'ers are political in con-
temporar)' China because the ultimate consequence of these litigations, if
successful, may lead to the change of the political system from one part)'
autocracy to constitutional democracy.
The current rights defence movement is new in two senses. First,
the current rights defence movement rights are grounded in an existing
legal framework and legal process. It is based on the assumption that a
societ)''s "pressure valve" is a judicial system that is just, highly effective,
publicly trusted, and able to check public power; and that with an autono-
mous judicial system that enables courts to truly carr)' out their role in-
dependendy in accordance with the law, social conflict can come within
the orbit of the law. The new features of the Sun Zhigang case lay in the
fact that it was not only a human rights case fought by ordinär)' citizens
against abuses by the state, but also a case that led to the positive re-
sponse of institutional reform by the state to redress human rights abus-
es. Second, the movement's leadership is provided by the legal profes-
sion, rights defence law)'ers in particular, and other citizen activists rather
than known Chinese democracy movement leaders. The identit)' of Liu
Xiaobo is interesting. From his involvement in the 1989 democracy
movement and his time ser\'-ing as president of the semi-legal Independ-
ent Chinese PEN Centre, he can be seen as an activist in the Chinese
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democracy movement in a broad sense. However, he is not regarded as a
leader of the Chinese democracy movement in the strict sense either by
other leaders of this movement or by the Chinese communist govern-
ment, as he has not played any role in the formal organisations of the
democracy movement. Most leaders of the rights defence movement
have not been regarded by themselves or by the party-state as dissidents.
However, the story of how a petition sent to the National People's Con-
gress by three young doctoral graduates in law from Beijing Universit}'
(Jiang Yu, Teng Biao and Xu Zhiyong who later became rights lawyers)
played a key role in bringing about a rare review on constitutional viola-
tion and the subsequent abolition of the notorious Regulations on De-
tention and Repatriation of Beggars and Floating Population has become
known to all. With their professional knowledge and extraordinär)' cour-
age, rights defence lawyers have fought on the frontline and have pro-
vided leadership to the emerging rights defence movement (Carnes
2006). These human rights lawyers have been hailed as "heroes of our
times" or the "men of the hour", and have enjoyed an increasingly high
profile in the Chinese and international media (Ji and Wang 2005; Hu
2006; Mosher and Poon 2009).
Actually, the strategy of the rights defence movement is hotly debat-
ed and different approaches are put forward among rights lawyers (Teng
2006; Kahn 2007; Guo 2008). The mainstream take a soft line, holding
the belief or hope that the communist bureaucracy is not monolithic and
that the current top communist leaders, committed as they are to attract-
ing foreign investment and making the country a respected world power,
are running the country "according to law". They are of the opinion that
the basic duty of rights lawyers is to help citizens exercise the rights
granted to them within the current legal framework; through individual
litigations against rights violation, rights lawyers are effecting positive
policy and institutional changes and raising the awareness of the concept
of human rights.
Some notable victories have been won by this approach. The "stub-
born as a nail household" ( I T i ^ , ding^hii), a family who refused to
vacate their home to make way for real estate development in Chong-
qing, Sichuan province attracted international attention in March 2007,
and led to a negotiated setdement with the developers the following
month. This was seen as a test case on the government's enforcement of
the new Property Law. Likewise, the protests by residents of the coastal
cit}' of Xiamen in the second half of 2007 forced a giant petrochemical
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plant (investment of 1.41 billion USD) with strong political connections
and government support to relocate elsewhere, marking probably the
first direct concession made by the Chinese government to public de-
mands through demonstrations. Again in Januar)^ 2008, similar protests
by Shanghai residents forced the Shanghai government to reconsider its
maglev train project to connect Hongqiao International Airport with
Pudong International Airport. In November 2008, starting in Chong-
qing, one of China's four provincial-level municipalities, and extending
later to Jing2hou, Lanzhou, Sanya, Dali, Shantou and other cities, thou-
sands of taxi drivers went on strike over high operating costs, high traffic
fines, shortages of natural gas and the government's lack of effort in
reining in unlicensed taxi operators who were stealing fares away. Local
governments in these cities negotiated with the strikers and took emer-
gency measures to address their demands. These examples are significant
because the Chinese government, with its tradition of top-down decision
making, secretive deliberations and litde tolerance for dissent, previously
had almost no practice of engaging in real popular consultation. The
positive responses from the government were precisely what had been
expected by the activists and other participants in the rights defence
movement. The soft approach has also been named the "middle way
model of rights defence" (Fan 2005, 2010a, 2010b). Apart from striking a
balance between violent revolution and obedience to autocracy, the suc-
cess of the "middle way model of rights defence" is also predicated on
the positive interaction between the government and society.
By contrast, for those who take a harder line, it is futile and even
harmful to seek compromise with the ruling Chinese Communist Party,
as even the "enlightened leader" Hu Jintao, in spite of his talks of ex-
panding constitutional rights and strengthening the legal system, tight-
ened the Party's control over the courts and continued to persecute
rights law)'ers; it is impossible to win political cases for defendants as
courts are stricdy controlled by the Party; and the main purpose of law-
suits is to expose the evils of the Chinese legal system and the crimes of
the communist government. This group of rights law)'ers also support
Internet campaigns and mass demonstrations, including demonstrations
involving violence. Gao Zhisheng, Guo Feixiong and Guo Guoting,
three major advocates of this line, have been ruthlessly punished by the
party-state. Gao Zhisheng has been deprived of his licence to practise
law, having been convicted of "inciting subversion", and has been re-
peatedly tortured in prison and has repeatedly "disappeared" at the
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hands of the security apparatus. Guo Guoting has also been deprived of
his licence to practise law, having also been convicted of "inciting sub-
version", and forced into exile. The third proponent of the hard line,
Guo Feixiong has been repeatedly beaten by police and sentenced to five
years in prison on the charge of "illegal business activities".
This situation has posed a dilemma for the rights defence move-
ment. Litigation at courts within the existing Chinese legal framework
can only produce very limited results, as the Chinese authorities choose
to ignore their own laws in violating the rights of citizens and refusing to
redress the grievances of citizens; while direct calls for the overthrow of
the communist regime or protests by force in the streets wiH be met with
brutal suppression. It was against this backdrop that Liu Xiaobo and his
colleagues drafted and published Charter 08, which to a certain extent
could be claimed as the programmatic document of the rights defence
movement.
Charter 08 is a result of the rights defence movement, as well as a
guide for the future developrnent of the movement, combining demands
for concrete rights and benefits with a political blueprint. It pools to-
gether the major demands raised in the movement, ranging from the
demand by the peasants for land ownership to the demand by the mi-
grant peasant-workers for equal national treatment as urban residents;
from the demand by the rich for the freedom of establishing enterprises
to the demand by both the urban poor and the rural poor for basic social
security; and from the specific demand for abolishing the re-education-
through-labour system to the general demand for the protection of hu-
man rights and the environment. It also provides the movement with a
political goal and direction through generalising the ideas advocated by
Chinese liberal intellectuals in recent years. The relative isolation of stu-
dents and intellectuals has been identified as a major failing of the 1989
Chinese Democracy Movement (Cherrington 1991; Goldman 1994). In
contrast, the main force of the rights defence movement is the main-
stream of society, including workers, peasants, businesspeople and pro-
fessionals of all trades rather than just students. By providing political
and intellectual guidance and articulating social, economic and political
demands across all social strata, and by carrying the spirit of justice,
peace, rationality and the rule of law. Charter 08 heralds a coalition be-
tween intellectuals and the "broad masses of the people" and the con-
vergence of social movement and political démocratisation. The coalition
is also reflected in the fact that the 303 original signatories and thousands
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of later signatories of Charter 08 come from ver)' diverse professional
backgrounds and social strata, such as scholars of all disciplines, grass-
roots NGO leaders, law)^ers, writers, journalists, editors, teachers, artists,
officials, public ser\^ants, engineers, businessmen, workers, peasants,
democracy activists and rights activists.
This kind of coalition and convergence is exactiy what is needed for
China's further development and what is expected by Chinese reformers
when die reform is losing its momentum. Echoing Charter 08 and using
milder language more acceptable to Party leaders, 16 senior party mem-
bers, including Du Daozheng (director of Yanhuang Chunqiu, former
director of the State Press Bureau and former chief editor of Guangming
Daily), Du Guang (former director of the Research Office and the Li-
brarian at the Central School of the CCP),. Gao Shangquan (President of
the China Economic System Reform Association and former deputy
chair of the State Economic System Reform Committee), Li Rui (former
deputy chief of the Organization Department of the CCP Central Com-
mittee), Li Pu (former deputy director of the Xinhua News Agency), Zhóng
Peizhang (former director of the News Bureau, the Propaganda Depart-
ment of the CCP Central Committee) and Zhu Houze (former Part)'
Secretar)' of Guizhou province and chief of the Propaganda Department
of the CCP Central Committee) presented a petition to the CCP Stand-
ing Committee of the Politburo on 20 Januar)' 2009. Instead of direcdy
laying down those liberal principles, the petition urged the Party leader-
ship to "guarantee and put into effect the citizen rights stipulated in the
Constitution" and to "make a breakthrough in reform and opening by
overcoming the obstruction of vested interests". The petition also made
several policy recommendations, such as establishing democratic proce-
dure to guarantee the proper use of the 4 trillion CNY economic rescue
package, resuming the program of political reform formulated by the
13th Party Congress, strengthening the independence of supervisor)'
bodies, liberalising the media, and widening the space for the develop-
ment of NGOs (Feng et al. 2009).
Again, echoing the announcement of the award of the Nobel Peace
Prize to Liu Xiaobo, and in the run-up to the 5th Plenum of the 17th
Party Congress, 23 former ranking Communist Party members, including
Li Rui, Li Pu, Hu Jiwei (former director and chief editor of the People's
Daily) and Jiang Ping (former president of the Chinese University of Law
and Political Science), sent an open letter to the Standing Committee of
the National People's Congress on 11 October 2010, calling for an end
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to censorship in China. The letter cited article 35 of Chinese Constitu-
tion and demanded that the state honour its commitment to the freedom
of speech and the press. It lamented that censorship in China has
reached such an absurd level as to suppress and muzzle the speech of the
head of the Chinese government. Premier Wen Jiabao (Li et al. 2010).
Premier Wen seemed to have caused a deep concern among his col-
leagues in the Politburo by repeatedly calling for democratic reform and
declaring in his interview on CNN that:
I beueve I and all the Chinese people have such a conviction that
China will make continuous progress, and the people's wishes for and
needs for democracy and freedom are irresistible, [...] I will not fall in
spite of the strong wind and harsh rain, and I wiH not }'ield undl the
last day of my life (Wen 2010).
The mainstream of the Party leadership have not been moved by Charter
08, the calls of those retired liberal officials, or the calls of Premier Wen
Jiabao, however. They are still locked in the mentality and desire to
maintain the communist autocracy forever in the name of stabiüty
preservation. They do not see the rights defence movement, the growth
of rights consciousness and civu society in particular, as political progress
in the right direction, but continue to see it as a serious challenge to their
authority and a serious threat to their survival. As a consequence, the
party-state and Chinese society are moving in opposite directions. In-
stead of engaging in positive interactions with the liberal forces and Chi-
nese societ}' to move forward, the party-state has moved backward and
upgraded its systematic suppression of social and political activism to a
higher level since 2009, coupling minimum concessions with stern
crackdowns by the massive and exceptionally rich repression apparatus.
The concessions included an increase of personnel and budget for
mediation in disputes and payments to victims, but the priority was given
to comprehensive crackdowns, attacking NGOs, controlling the media
and jailing or monitoring a large number of targets on the black lists of
the state, such as separatists, Falungong adherents, democracy move-
ment leaders, "house church" priests, human rights law}'ers, "disobedi-
ent" journalists, public intellectuals and petitioners (Wu 2009: 25-39).
Rights law}'ers and NGOs were particularly hard hit in this new round of
State repression. The choice of the Open Constitution Initiative, a legal
NGO run by rights lawyers and legal scholars, as a target of coordinated
attack in July 2009 revealed the attempt by the party-state to roU back the
activities of NGOs and rights lawyers. The group of rights law}'ers and
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legal scholars gathering at the Open Constitution Initiative were
moderates within the rights defence movement. They fought for social
justice, but also rejected radicalism. They actively cooperated with the
pursuit for "good governance" by the Hu-Wen leadership and showed
their best intentions and constructive attitude to the government by
refraining from taking on sensitive cases involved separatists, Falungong
and the Chinese democracy movement. However, they became a target
of government attack in the end, as they were increasingly influential
nationally and internationally in providing essential legal aid to high pro-
file public interest cases such as environment protection, food security,
freedom of the press, forced home eviction, forced land requisition and
"black jails" unlawfully detaining and repatriating petitioners (Wong
2009).
More dramatically, an anonymous online appeal for a political gath-
ering on 20 Februar)' 2011 and following Sundays prompted a spate of
coordinated assaults by the securit)' apparatus, sending thousands of
uniformed and plain-clothed police to each location within those nomi-
nated cities and organising debilitating attacks by thousands of hackers
on the Boxun website which issued the message calling for the "Jasmine
Revolution". The securit}' apparatus also rounded up, detained, placed
under house arrest or caused to "disappear" dozens of rights law)'ers,
opinion leaders and other activists nationwide.
The retrogression from China's march towards the rule of law has
serious consequences for the part)'-state as well as societ)'. Why does the
party-state see the legal assertion of citizen rights in the rights defence
movement as a threat rather than a remedy? One possible explanation is
that the partj'-state's flirtation with the rule of law is nothing more than
professing love for what it actuaDy fears. This fits perfecdy with the alle-
gor)' of Lord Ye's love of dragons (f^tÄ^f >iè. Ye gong hao lon¿}. Ye Gong
was so fond of dragons that he decorated ever)'thing in his home with-
dragon designs. A real dragon went to visit to see Ye's love for dragons
for itself, but when it stuck its head through the window. Ye Gong was
so frightened that he ran away. This idiom satirises those who profess to
like or support something, but are averse to it in actual practice. The
part)'-state was:
not fully aware of the power of the new ideas of rights and law it was
promoting. When this power was finally recognised, the leadership (or
an important part of it) saw it as a threat (Pils 2009: 141).
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In the past, reform measures have been taken by tbe CCP leadership as
long as these nieasures have been perceived as preserving or enhancing
tbe CCP monopoly of poHtical power. The CCP leadership has repeated-
ly marched backward and roüed back these reforms when they have been
seen to pose a tbreat to CCP rule. Another possibility is tbat tbe current
Chinese communist regime is dominated by a corrupt power elite and
has thus lost its capacity to implement meaningful legal and political
reform, even if it were willing to do so. Either way, when the slogans
"stabüit}' overriding everything" and "nipping destabüising elements in
tbe bud" are put into effect, artificial "stabuity" is imposed by the party-
state at tbe expense of justice, human rights, tbe rule of law, reform and
progress, leading to more dangerous instability and wbat is caüed by
Chinese sociologists as "social deca}'" (í t^ítR^, shehui kuibai) with seri-
ous repercussions such as structural corruption and "un-governabüity"
^ Ö ^ ^ , bu ke ^hili ^huangtai) (Sun 2009).
Conclusion: The Party-state as an Institutional
Obstacle to Social Stability
It is tbe predicament of weiquan (Éi$l, rights defence) to reveal the pit-
faüs of weiwen (è'illl, stabiüty preservation), a concept that has been tbe'
poUtical order since 1989 and has become a focus of public debate since
2009. Tbe normal responsibilities and functions of a government include
provision of pubUc goods and public order. The stability discourse and
tbe additional administrative institutions of stabüit}' preservation imply
extraordinary measures taken by the Chinese communist regime to arrest
tbe trend of democratic cbange and perpetuate communist rule after the
global collapse of communism. Tbe thesis of Chinese government is that
China can succeed in economic development only under conditions of
stability and only the one-party rule by the CCP can ensure stabuity.
Tbe vast majority of Cbinese sbare tbe perception of tbe CCP lead-
ership in recognising tbat stabiüty is a precondition for continued eco-
nomic growth, but tbey do not accept that continued communist rule is
the only guarantee for stabuity. The reality is that the social order in Chi-
na bas continued to deteriorate under tbe heavy-handed poHcy of com-
munist rule and tbe country is facing enormous problems that threaten
its fundamental stabiüty. From tbe ver}' beginning, the Chinese govern-
ment and the population differed greatiy in tbeir focus and approach.
Whereas the major concern of tbe government is regime survival, tbe
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population is yearning for a new order where society is free of unrest, the
government is legitimate and supported by the population, social order is
preserved thiough positive interactions between the government and the
population, as well as among the population with the best intentions,
human rights are guaranteed, and citizens enjoy a peaceful life and op-
portunities to improve their living standards. Given that the guarantee
for stability is the function of institutions and mechanisms to expel evils,
redress grievances, deliver justice and balance legitimate interests, the
success of the rights defence movement, or the effective protection of
human rights, is an essential prerequisite for social stability in China.
There are signs that both "rights defence" by the Chinese popula-
tion and "stability preservation" by the government in their current
forms are approaching a dead end. On the part of the Chinese govern-
ment, when the budget for internal security has surpassed the huge
budget of national defence; when stability preser\'ation has become an
excuse for corrupt officials to abuse power for personal gains and to
eliminate any elements of the social and political progress of easing social
instability; and when the efforts of stability preser^^ation at all costs have
managed to make both politics and society more unstable, the policy of
stability preser\'^ation at the expense of justice and human rights proves
to be increasingly untenable. On the part of Chinese population, when
the request for the rehabilitation of the abuses of public power has been
met with more abuses by the government and legal institutions; when
scholars offering constructive proposals for political development and
the protection of basic human rights are jailed for the "crime of subvert-
ing state power" or the "crime of inciting the subversion of state power",
and the efforts of human rights activists to prevent political confronta-
tion for safety consideration have only led to political persecution; and
when rights law}'ers who help to enforce relevant laws and provide legal
remedy for rights violation have become a primar)^ target of the security
apparatus, the "rights defence movement" is blocked by the politics it
tries to avoid.
In a nutshell, the source of social instability in China is the unequal
distribution of power, wealth, opportunities, and benefits due to a power
structure based on one-party rule. The preservation of one-party rule
through violence contributes to social instability rather than reducing it.
The perpetuation of one-party rule in China is an attempt to arrest the
progress of history and the CCP leadership is defending the indefensible
in the long run. In fact, a variety of rights defenders have formed a quasi-
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Opposition, exercising pressure on the government to negotiate a new
social and political order. Their individual or collective rights defence
actions such as lawsuits, petitions, strikes and demonstrations for achiev-
able rights and benefits as righteous claims are just normal means of
interest articulation and expression, aimed at negotiated outcome with
the state. Whereas the use of violence by the state to suppress protests
and dissenting voices has further alienated the population and generated
increasing resentment, tension and confrontations, concession from the
state may open up the possibüit}' for the transformation from the post-
totalitarian to a liberal democratic order. There is a growing voice not
only among the population, but also within the party-state calling for
effective wáquan to be taken as the core of weiwen, although it remains to
be seen whether or not the CCP leadership wül change its course to
accommodate the rights defence movement and eventually strike out on
a new path towards constitutional democracy.
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